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The thesis of this Essay is that any successful movement for equali-
ty-indeed, any movement for freedom-for gay people needs the in-
sights and theories of feminism for sustenance and for flourishing. Draw-
ing heavily on the work of radical feminist scholar Ann Scales, and with
special emphasis on the importance of feminism to the lives and political
aspirations of gay men, the Essay compares the theoretical matrices of
feminist legal theory and queer legal theory. By exploring the relevance
of issues generally thought of as "feminist issues," such as pornography
and abortion, to gay men's lives, the Essay shows that, rather than aban-
don feminism as much of queer theory suggests, gay men-and all
LGBT people-should embrace feminism as a fundamental component
of an ethical movement toward substantive, social, and legal equality.
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Solidarity is possible .... Solidarity is also the only viable option for
progressive people. The liberal ideal of absolute individualism makes
no sense in a world of inevitably interdependent language users....
Solidarity requires constant reevaluation of issues and constant reju-
venation of commitments and coalitions.
-Ann Scales
1
Outsider jurisprudence asserts ... that oppression on the bases of
race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and class is unjust if any-
thing is unjust.
-Ann Scales2




I have to say that I have been and remain ambivalent about being a
part of this Symposium. It is, without question, the most difficult writing
I have undertaken in my professional life. This kind of occasion, in
which a friend is memorialized, is a splendid thing. It invites us to re-
member that Ann is present, all of her, in her written work, and that she
lives on in it, continues to speak to us through it. For those of us close to
her, that offers some comfort. Nevertheless, an event like this also re-
quires one to practice an ethics of interpretation on one's friend. It asks
that a whole human life, and the body of work from which that life was
in ways large and small inseparable, be cut to pieces. The fact that one
must be dismembered in order to be remembered is, in my opinion, the
saddest of ironies. So I struggled.
Because of the breadth and depth of Ann's insight, I could have
gone in many directions with this piece. At first, I thought I would write
something about legal education. That would have been easy; there's
plenty wrong with it, as Ann knew well. Had I read her incredible article,
Surviving Legal De-Education, before going to law school, I would have
been a better law student. At the least, I would have understood what law
1. Ann Scales, Poststructuralism on Trial, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY:
INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 395, 407 (Martha Albertson Fineman
et al. eds., 2009).
2. Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 28-29
(1992).




school was doing to me, why my energy was drained-why I was a little
crazy. In Surviving Legal De-Education, Ann riffed on Scott Turow's
One L, in which he described law students in a way that assumed a lot
about who law school, and by extension the law, was really for.4 Of
course, Turow was writing about that law school "Shining on a Hill," as
it were, the prestigious5 Harvard, where students and faculty are thought
of as Olympians.6 Ann and Turow were classmates, and she makes an
appearance, albeit a background one, in One L.7 Of course, the problems
in legal education that Ann identified don't just exist at Harvard. They
are systemic. In short, the late, great Derrick Bell would have to have
blown up more than just Harvard Law School in order to save us.8 In the
end, I felt I couldn't improve on what Ann saw and addressed, returning
as she did to the theme in Midnight Train to Us9 and Feminists in the
Field of Time,'° and in other work. I abandoned the theme.
Then I pondered the question with which Ann began her beautiful
book, Legal Feminism: "Does [legal feminism] have a future?"" If it
does, what does it look like? I remembered Adrienne Rich's observation,
a lifetime ago now, that so very little work had imagined a feminist uto-
pia. I noted that little has changed since Rich originally penned this
observation in 1974. So, I set about the work of imagining such a thing.
A friend had encouraged me to write a narrative piece. Now, I thought,
was the time to do it. After all, Ann had been emphatic about storytell-
ing's importance to liberation.13 So, I imagined that Ann, now abiding in
the Feminist Future, came to visit me. I imagined our conversations
about what this future would be like and what those of us here, now,
could do to realize its possibility. Hearing Ann's voice in my head, revel-
ing, again, in her sharp wit and keen sense of humor, and of course her
4. Turow had written of his first year classmates: "We are men and women drawn to the
study of rules, people with a native taste for order." SCOTT TUROW, ONE L 300 (1977). Ann im-
proved substantially upon this perspective, writing: "The day is coming soon when some right-
minded successor to Scott Turow can write about her first-year classmates: We are women and men
drawn to the living of life, people with a native taste for survival, for diversity, and for freedom."
Scales, supra note 3, at 164.
5. 1 am always mindful that the original meaning of the word prestige is a "trick." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 983 (1 1th ed. 2003) (defining the word prestige).
6. See TUROW, supra note 4, at 10, 12.
7. See Scales, supra note 3, at 164.
8. See Derrick Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2382, 2382 (1989).
9. Ann C. Scales, Midnight Train to Us, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 710, 710-11(1990).
10. Ann C. Scales, Feminists in the Field of Time, 42 FLA. L. REV. 95, 97-98 (1990).
11. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, & LEGAL THEORY 1 (2006).
12. ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE 1966-1978, at 153
(1979) ("I have been trying to think of a celebrated literary utopia written by a woman.... Even
minds practiced in criticism of the status quo resist a vision so apparently unnerving as that which
foresees an end to male privilege and a changed relationship between the sexes.").
13. See, e.g., Ann Scales, supra note 3, at 148 ("Included in these alternative realities are
transformative versions of authority, power, and order.... [l]n Robin West's words, . . . we [must]
'flood the market with our own stories,' until they are heard, until there is room for us simply to be
who we are." (quoting Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Ctll. L. REV. 1, 65 (1988))).
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masterly feminist philosophy, was a beautiful experience. I wrote all of
these conversations down. But something wasn't quite right. How would
these "conversations" translate in a forum requiring a live address to a
room full of people? In short, how could this project translate as anything
other than schizophrenic? I may yet take this quantum leap with my
friend, but now isn't the time. So I put it all away and started over again.
I think the reason for all of this grasping, the fits of starting and
stopping, was that I resisted saying what needed to be said. I didn't want
to talk about what this Essay ended up discussing. I didn't want to talk
about the relationship of radical feminism to gay men's lives-at least
not now. Mostly, I think, I didn't want to do it because it risks contrib-
uting to the well-worn criticism that feminism should be avoided because
it is too contentious.'4 And certainly I didn't want to take this moment
about Ann, rightly perceived as a moment about women, and turn it into
something about men (thus reinforcing the suspicion that many women
have about male feminists). And most assuredly I didn't want to be per-
ceived as taking a moment that is supposed to be all about Ann and mak-
ing it all about me. Basically, my fear was that in saying what I wanted
to say for this occasion Ann might be, somehow, lost. What I finally real-
ized, what made this Essay finally possible, was that far from being lost
in it, Ann's work is essential to any discussion uncovering why and how
gay liberation goes "off the rails," as one of my readers put it, 15 when it
attempts to separate from radical feminism. It was Ann's great love for
gay people-for gay women and men-that led her to insist that femi-
nism matters in our lives, even in the lives of gay men, and led her to
take unpopular positions on gay pornography.'6 And it was Ann's friend-
ship-her love for me and mine for her-that made so much of my work
possible.
Ann was always interested in what she called feminism's sharpest
edges, by which we continually shape its possibilities. And so I joined
14. See Diane Richardson, "Misguided, Dangerous and Wrong" on the Maligning of Radical
Feminism, in RADICALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM RECLAIMED 143, 143-54 (Diane Bell & Renate
Klein eds., 1996), for a discussion.
15. E-mail from Jeffrey Vanek to author (Aug. 28, 2012, 12:48 PM).
16. Ann supported an equality-based regulation of pornography in Canada, in the landmark
decision R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.), and opposed excepting gay marketed materials
from that definition. See Ann Scales, Avoiding Constitutional Depression: Bad Attitudes and the
Fate of Butler, 7 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 349, 349 (1994). In fact, Ann was called as an expert witness
for the Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium, a distributor of gay porn at issue in the Canadian case
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (Can.),
in which several gay groups lobbied for gay porn to remain unregulable under the Butler standard
because it, according to them, isn't harmful. See Scales, supra, at 352 n.4. Ann very nearly was not
called when these groups found out that her position was that gay pornography did produce equality-
based harms to gays as a group and should be subjected to the Butler analysis. See Audrey Fannin,
'Conversation with... 'Speaker Advises Students to Not Do Work They Hate, WAKE FOREST U. SCH.
L. (Oct. 7, 2010), http:l/news.law.wfu.edu/2010/l0/a-'conversation-with- ... '-ann-scales/. She was
careful to underscore that gay pornography should not be marked for any especially burdensome
legal targeting simply because it was gay-oriented. Scales, supra, at 356.
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this Symposium to talk about the role that feminist jurisprudence has to
play in the lives of gay men, not because I enjoy doing it, but because I
think it is what Ann would have wanted me to say in relation to her
work. I think the most striking possibility feminism brings to gay men's
lives is the possibility of love unmodified. As Ann emphasized, quoting
Robin West, "I can't imagine any project more crucial, right now, to the
survival of this species than the clear articulation of the importance of
love to a well-led public life."' 17 I haven't had the opportunity to hear or
read Katherine Franke's keynote address before drafting these thoughts,
but if this is what she is reflecting when she describes Ann's feminist
method as "[t]aking a [b]reak from [a]crimony," then she will have done
Ann's life and work some justice.18
Ann believed in solidarity. Although it may not be apparent on the
surface, the practice of solidarity flows directly from the feminist prac-
tice of relating political ideas and actions to personal experiences through
seeking in one's own oppression a basis for solidarity with others. In this
very real sense, emotional support becomes political support, laying
aside forever the false dichotomy posed by the patriarchalists that tells us
that choosing the values of connectedness necessarily means walking
away from moral agency.19
INTRODUCTION
Ann Scales dedicated her life to "[f]eminism [u]nmodified,
' 20
which is to say Radical Feminism, which is to say exactly what Ann
17. Scales, supra note 9, at 718 (quoting West, supra note 13, at 65 (1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Ann's focus on a "public life" makes her revelation here no less relevant to queer theory,
despite queer theory's preference for an explanation of the world centered on individual choices, as
opposed to recognition of group-based realities. As I have noted:
The political and civic institutions that create, shape, and enforce laws and define com-
munities-and our active and conscientious involvement in them-are necessary because
without them many of the intensely private and personal aspects of our lives would not be
possible .... [O]ur neglect of our public responsibilities will not only perpetuate our pub-
lic inequality but also will ultimately threaten the privacy we often prize above all else.
SHANNON GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS: THE GAY PERSON IN AMERICA TODAY 86-87 (2006).
18. Katherine Franke, Isidor & Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law & Dir., Ctr. for Gend. &
Sexuality Law, Columbia Law Sch., Keynote Address at the University of Denver Sturm College of
Law Symposium Honoring the Work of Ann Scales: Taking a Break from Acrimony: The Feminist
Method of Ann Scales (Mar. 30, 2013).
19. See Scales, supra note 9, at 718 n.25 ("I am not suggesting that we have to choose the
values of connectedness and caring and survival over our individual freedom or well-being or moral
agency. To posit that either set of values must be relinquished in favor of the other is simply to buy
right back into the same destructive dichotomy between self and world.").
See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 306-07 (1995), for a discussion on the role of the concept of "agency" in
feminist theory, particularly for its centrality to strains of feminism critical of radical feminism.
20. This is, of course, a direct reference to the work of Catharine MacKinnon. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 262 (1987)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]. Ann was proud to be associated with MacKin-
non. Time and again in her written work and public speeches on feminism, Ann invoked MacKin-
non. For Ann, feminism was synonymous with the "antisubordination theory" or dominance femi-
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said-and meant-when she said "feminist jurisprudence"-a field, it is
useful to remember, that she named.21 So I would feel somehow dishon-
est contributing to a symposium remembering her and celebrating her
work without taking a close look at what feminist jurisprudence is, what
it looks like, and what it does in the real world, which Ann's work taken
in its totality emphatically tells us is the only place it matters. In sketch-
ing out what feminism means for gay men, I can do little better than
build on the definition Ann provided:
Positively, the feminism I know is concrete, antiessentialist, con-
textual, instrumental, eclectic, and open-minded. It is concrete be-
cause it grew from and answers to the real experiences of subordina-
tion caused both to women and men by gender hierarchy. It does not
depend on any transcendental moral principle, unless a commitment
to equality is that. Indeed, the feminism of which I speak is antifoun-
dationalist ... because it recognizes that foundationalist explanations
usually are excuses for social inequalities. The feminism of which I
write is antiessentialist because not only is point-of-view the primary
referent for social action but point-of-view is itself an elastic and
contextual phenomenon. All of the ways that each of us participates
nism MacKinnon has done so much to shape. See SCALES, supra note 11, at 9, 13 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In her book, Legal Feminism, Ann described the importance of MacKinnon's theory to
her own feminist theory and activism.
Before critics dismiss the book solely on [the ground of its reliance on MacKinnon's
work], I would ask them to consider why they would do so. Even those who vehemently
disagree with MacKinnon must acknowledge that much contemporary legal theory is in-
spired by her work or transpires in (sometimes saliva-sputtering) response to her work.
As a purely academic matter, it is distressing to me how MacKinnon has been carica-
tured. I have observed, again and again, how often MacKinnon's critics have not read her
writings, or not read them with care, or have failed to reread those works as circumstanc-
es required .... [Olne needs to understand ... that much of contemporary United States
jurisprudence is connected to MacKinnon. No serious treatment of feminist legal theory
can fail to engage her work.
Id. at 13.
Ann also describes her own feminism being in a place of "stuckness," until she encoun-
tered MacKinnon's "inequality approach," presented in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 174 (1979) (emphasis omit-
ted). See Scales, supra note 2, at 11. In 1997, Ann wrote:
I read Professor MacKinnon's first book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, and I
began to feel that an explanation (maybe even a better world) was possible .... I spent
many hours mapping her dominance approach against everything I knew about law, and
testing it against my entire experience of politics and human misery. It rang not only true,
but transformative.
Ann Scales, Disappearing Medusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
34, 39-40 (1997) [hereinafter Scales, Disappearing Medusa] (footnote omitted).
21. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (9th ed. 2009) (crediting Ann Scales with the first
published use of the term "feminist jurisprudence" (quoting GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 129-30 (1995)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Compare Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 193 (1989-1990) (identifying a panel moderated by Ann Scales as
the inaugural forum for "feminist jurisprudence" (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Sheila
James Kuehl, For the Women's Reach Should Exceed Their Grasp, or How's a Law Journal to Be
Born?, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5, 9 (1997) (crediting Ann Scales with coining the term "feminist
jurisprudence" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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in our various identities are constituted by historical, cultural, and in-
dividual practices. The sources of essentialism are beyond feminist
control. Existing modes of power attempt to essentialize our identi-
ties, the better to capture each and every new incarnation as a market
niche. My feminism is built from resistance to that.
22
In order to expand on this kind of definitional project, it is necessary
to include some things and exclude others. This is bound to make some
in my audience nervous, if not bitterly resentful. This is a risk I feel is
worth bearing in this moment, in the name and memory of the woman
whose life and friendship meant so much to me, who taught me just ex-
actly what the well-worn feminist quote "[t]he personal is political"
means.23 Our friendship was simultaneously personal and political, the
two inseparable, fiercely both at all times, and in hindsight left me doubt-
ful of my own admonition that "lov[ing] [someone] for political reasons"
might be an impossible thing.24 Ann's place in my life as a strong lesbian
mother-sister-friend, thus her feminism and magnificent gayness, and
my experience of it, has taught me that.
In honor of that presence, I want to use the space allotted me here to
draw, as directly as I know how, the links between radical feminism and
gay male liberation. In so doing, I will engage the poststructuralist heo-
retical project generally named "queer theory," in order to show just ex-
actly what its engagement with reality on a contingency basis only (mak-
ing it an antithesis of feminism) costs.25 My many conversations with
Ann infused my last book, The End of Straight Supremacy.26 Although
most of the reviews of that book have been praiseful, I was struck by one
review, by Dennis Altman, that chastised me for "[t]he application of an
22. SCALES, supra note I1, at 8. To Ann's final point, I would add these illuminating observa-
tions about queer life, generally of the trend in consumerism experienced as politics and
a more mainstream cultural trend that both invites and disavows queer... identity ....
To cite a few prominent examples: the rise of a new gay and lesbian niche market in the
1990s; the new "cultural visibility" of queers in public life; the cultural fascination with
the figure of the "metrosexual"; the recycling and mainstreaming of lesbian sartorial
styles, ranging from the campiness of drag king culture to the refined and sexy androgyny
of the L.A. lesbian look (popularized by the The L Word); and the neutralization of
"queer" through shows such as Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, which cemented the as-
sociation of homosexual aestheticism with a particularly vapid and rationalized notion of
lifestyle.
ELISA GLICK, MATERIALIZING QUEER DESIRE: OSCAR WILDE TO ANDY WARHOL 162 (2009).
23. See Robin Morgan, The Personal Is Still Political, 16 NEW PERSP. Q. 53, 53 (1999) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
24. SHANNON GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY: REALIZING GAY LIBERATION
43 n.46 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Queer theory and queer legal theory are not monoliths. And not all work identifying with
queer theory or as queer aligns itself with straight supremacy in the ways I critique in this Essay.
Professor Francisco Valdes's work is a notable example. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Outsider
Scholars, Critical Race Theory, and "OutCrit" Perspectivity: Postsubordination Vision as Jurispru-
dential Method, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 399, 399
(Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002). However, much of, if not most of, queer theory and queer legal
theory shares the characteristics I critique below.
26. GILREATH, supra note 24, at xiii.
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anti-porn feminism to mainstream gay pornography .... As grateful
as I am for Ann's mentorship that so shaped the theory that emerged in
The End of Straight Supremacy, I find myself grateful to her, again, for
the context to address this important criticism of our work.28
I. FEMINISM AND GAY MEN
To query what feminism has to offer gay men-why it is essential
to our lives-requires me to define feminism. Notwithstanding the gen-
eral history of feminist infighting for theoretical primacy, one reason that
my defining feminist jurisprudence will be a source of unease is, frankly,
that I am a gay man. I think a lot of people become uncomfortable when
a gay man starts talking about feminism.29 When straight men do it there
is, naturally enough, suspicion. Yet, somehow the straight man can be
accepted because perhaps he is one of those darling men who has gotten
in touch with his "feminine side" and has made the absolutely Herculean
effort to learn to cry. My own experience, in some cases, is that when a
gay man speaks of feminism there is outright contempt from some wom-
en. Does he think he is a woman? Is he co-opting women's experiences
and women's oppression for his own ends? Surely it is not news to any
of us that a historical tension has existed between some radical feminists
and some gay men.30 There have been some good reasons for this, name-
ly that gay male culture is infused with a most recalcitrant form of mi-
sogyny.31 There is no denying that. It is also the case that in its rush to an
ethic of sexual limitlessness, much of so-called queer theory has inad-
vertently or intentionally exalted the very sexual sadism and ritualized
violence radical feminism opposes.
32
27. Dennis Altman, Can the Revolution Be Recovered?, GAY & LESBIAN REV., Mar.-Apr.
2012, at 30, 30-31 (reviewing SHANNON GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY:
REALIZING GAY LIBERATION (2011)).
28. 1 say our work because Ann too believed a sex equality theory of pornography was essen-
tial to gay liberation. In many ways, her work prefigured my own. See Scales, supra note 16, at 350,
358.
29. There is absolutely no question that most feminist work, not to mention feminist writing,
has been done by women-men have rarely and exceptionally participated in the project. See, e.g.,
Brian Klocke, Roles of Men with Feminism and Feminist Theory, NAT'L ORG. FOR MEN AGAINST
SEXISM, http://www.nomas.org/node/122 (last visited Dec. 5, 2013).
30. DAVID FERNBACH, THE SPIRAL PATH: A GAY CONTRIBUTION TO HUMAN SURVIVAL 18
(1981) ("Gay men start out from a very different relationship to the gender system than do women,
and the same applies to lesbians in so far as they struggle on the specific basis of their gayness.
While women are oppressed by being what the gender system requires them to be, offering them a
certain reward of legitimacy for being a 'proper' woman and accepting oppression, gay people are
oppressed by our inability-or refusal-to be 'proper' women or men .... The minimum starting-
point of the gay struggle, accordingly, is the demand for our right to exist, for a basic social toler-
ance. These two very different starting-points explain how it is that the women's and gay movements
have by no means immediately recognized each other as allies.").
31. See GILREATH, supra note 24, at 173-76, for discussion of male-over-female dominance
in gay pornography.
32. See, e.g., id. at 169-203 (discussing the dehumanization of gay pornography and women
in pornography); see also Marc Spindelman, Sexual Freedom 's Shadows, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
179, 191-200 (2011) (reviewing TIM DEAN, UNLIMITED INTIMACY: REFLECTIONS ON THE
SUBCULTURE OF BAREBACKING (2009)) (discussing the idea of sexual freedom).
[Vol. 91:1
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I think there has been, too, a self-imposed "gotcha" of sorts by some
radical feminists, whereby, in the attempt to shore up the distances sepa-
rating individual women, and thus create some solidarity in sisterhood,
seclusion from men was deemed necessary. This move alienated women
from a group-gay men-that should be a natural ally to feminist causes.
The late Mary Daly comes to mind with some prominence here. She
once wrote that women who identify as "gay" cannot be "Female-
identified.,33 In contrast, I have argued that solidarity between women
and gay men is essential to both groups.34 This is in the tradition of radi-
cal feminists, like the late Andrea Dworkin, who understood the connec-
tions we share in a gender system that operates to constrain and subdue
35
us.
Some of my male colleagues in the academy seem to think that my
work is accepted or better regarded by women in the academy because I
am a gay man, that the fact of my gayness somehow gives us, the women
and me, a common denominator of sorts. Naturally, I am, on account of
this, immediately suspect to these same male colleagues. I think, at
times, the phenomenological reality I always bring with me as a gay man
helps. For example, I think the fact that I can begin to explain a point in a
faculty meeting without relying on some asshole sports analogy is proba-
bly appreciated by most of my women colleagues (and, for that matter, in
class by my women students).36 And I think this is where the link that my
straight male colleagues believe they have identified between me, as a
gay man, and women stops in their minds. There is something more, of
course: there is the special bond between people who struggle together
for liberation from patriarchy-be they male or female. I have always
liked the way Andrea Dworkin put it when she said, "Women and male
homosexuals are united in their queerness . . . .37 Ann could be counted
with Andrea and with me in this understanding.38 Her feminism was un-
33. MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINIsM 376 (1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
34. See, e.g., GILREATH, supra note 24, at 25-27.
35. See ANDREA DWORKIN, Biological Superiority: The World's Most Dangerous and Dead-
ly Idea, in LETTERS FROM A WAR ZONE 110, 110-15 (1993), for a discussion of the downfalls of
superiority based on immutable traits, such as gender.
36. Ann had something to say about sports metaphors. She wrote with characteristic lucidity
that "the function of sports metaphors is not only to illustrate, but to legitim[ize] [male supremacy]."
Scales, supra note 3, at 149-50.
37. ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING 90 (1974) ("Women and male homosexuals are
united in their queerness, a union which is real and verifiable ... which contributes to the cultural
oppression of both.").
38. Of course, other feminists have also understood the need to include men in the struggle
against male supremacy. Bell Hooks, for example, wrote in 1984 that
[s]eparatist feminist rhetoric suggested that all men share equally in male privilege, that
all men reap positive benefits from sexism. Yet the poor or working-class man who has
been socialized via sexist ideology to believe that there are privileges and powers he
should possess solely because he is male often finds that few, if any, of these benefits are
automatically bestowed on him in life. More than any other male group in the United
States, he is constantly concerned about the contradiction between the notion of mascu-
linity he was taught and his inability to live up to that notion.
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modified but it was inclusive. As she put it, "[F]eminism" is not "a way
of thinking available only to persons born female. Rather, . . . femi-
nism.... [is] the critique of objectivity in epistemological, psychological,
and social-as well as legal-terms."39 Ann understood as well as any-
one I have yet encountered the importance of feminist writing that speaks
to everyone who might resist sexist oppression. She understood that real
feminist revolution happens when patriarchy is actually recognized and
resisted by women and men galvanized to challenge male supremacy.
Claiming radical feminism as my ground means that I challenge the
queer theoretical project, which has been antagonistic to the insistence of
feminist jurisprudence that real sexual injuries to real people, even when
those people are gay men, be acknowledged by the law and responded to
in concrete ways. This is a point of critical importance: feminist jurispru-
dence-in the way that Ann conceptualized and practiced it-means to
use the law to respond to and undermine social hierarchy in whatever
form, and not merely peripherally, but as the heart of feminist practice.
This feminism is, simply put, a theory of inequality based on the realities
of male-over-female domination, which has been the model for all forms
of systemic and systematic oppression. It is concrete and specific in this
regard, with the realities of women's lives lived under male dominance
forming the crucible from which a new way of knowing (not merely of
thinking)-an epistemology-emerged and continues to develop. The
work of legal feminism has been to connect this knowledge to the law, to
the coercive power of the state, and thus to speak truth to power.
The method of this feminism has been exposing the lies of male su-
premacy, which are mostly backed by the authority of the state through
the force of law-a law that takes the male point of view as the objec-
tive, neutral universal. As Ann put it, it is a system of law that "made
maleness the norm of what is human, and did so sub rosa, all in the name
of neutrality." 40 Significantly for the application and importance of radi-
cal feminism to gay liberation-and to gay men specifically-this femi-
nism was never, and never aspired to be, a claim to female subjectivity. It
was never a quest to supplant patriarchy for matriarchy. As Ann put it,
"Feminism does not claim to be objective, because objectivity is the ba-
sis for inequality."41 The feminism Ann embraced, worked for, sacrificed
BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 75 (2d ed. 2000).
I agree with the sentiment Hooks expressed here. Classism-and virtually every other
ism"-is a functionality of male supremacy. I do think, however, it's a shame that Hooks doesn't
engage gay male reality here, especially since she stresses that lower-class men "[m]ore than any
other male group" suffer from male supremacist norms. Id. I should think that of all men who suffer
from the "contradiction" between socialized masculinity and the "inability to live up to that notion,"
gay men deserve, at least, a mention. Id.
39. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373,
1373 n.2 (1986).
40. Id. at 1377.
41. Id. at 1385.
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for, and practiced was not about access to a subject position or its corol-
42lary power of objectification. Rather, this feminism was about naming
the reality of patriarchal oppression, establishing its contours, and chang-
ing them for the good of women and men. And surely no men suffer this
oppression more acutely than gay men. To accomplish this goal, it is
necessary, as Ann put it, to "resist[] abstraction.' 43 In that sense, femi-
nism cannot be "a practice that makes claim to objective, universal truth
in the way that, for example, some of the wilder versions of 'law and
economics' theory do." 44 Nor is radical feminism interested in the "op-
pression sweepstakes,45 in that it does not insist that women's experi-
ences as women are superior or constitutive of a metanarrative or meta-
theory that must exclude all men. It acknowledges that women and men
are defined and controlled by gender.
This brings me to my first point of engagement with feminist juris-
prudence and its relationship to queer theory. Whereas feminism has
been in many important ways a practice before it was a theory, with the
theory emerging from the practice of establishing an account of reality
under patriarchy based on lived experiences, queer theory has been an
academic enterprise, the result of postmodern theory, which has as its
basis a suspicion, even rejection, of claims to reality. Like everything
postmodern or poststructural, queer theory is an idolatry of the unreal; it
disputes that there are such creatures as "homosexuals" or "gays" or such
a thing as "gay identity."46 Again, this is simply an extension of the old
42. As I have said, "In a subject-object culture, one must be a subject in order to be objective
about much. To be objective about being objectified is to be dead." GILREATH, supra note 24, at 21.
43. Scales, supra note 39, at 1374.
44. Ann Scales, Law and Feminisim. Together in Struggle, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 291, 291
(2003).
45. Scales, supra note 3, at 160 (defining "oppression sweepstakes" as "a heated discussion
about whose treatment has been worse" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
46. One recent example is Katherine Franke, Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning
Gay Rights, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2012). Franke's is an extremely nuanced piece that
resists simplification, but despite its many qualifications, the article reveals the risk that poststructur-
alism poses for gays (I suppose I should write "same-sexers" or something here, because "gay" as an
identity is anathema to queer theory poststructuralism) who do not have even the meager protections
liberal legal concepts afford. Franke writes:
Once we recognize that the normative homosexuality that undergirds human rights dis-
course is not merely a "fact" in the world, but more of a complex value, it becomes easier
to see how the state's embrace of the sexual citizenship of these new human rights hold-
ers risks rendering more vulnerable a range of identities and policies that have refused to
conform to state-endorsed normative homo- or heterosexuality. This is true both for
queers whose desires refuse to orient themselves ineluctably toward marriage, as well as
for Muslims with sexual norms and practices ofpolyamory, homosociality, and modesty.
Id. at 40 (emphasis added). Professor Franke seems to make a (very nuanced) apology for Iran's
President Ahmadinejad's insistence that there "is no such thing" as a homosexual in Iran. Id. at 34.
For Franke, Ahmadinejad is possibly a victim of Western, imperialist misinterpretation. Quoting an
Iranian colleague translating Ahmadinejad, Franke explains:
[N]ow the other issue is that when the second time he says "In Iran there is no such
thing" the phrase that he uses is literally "such a thing has no external presence/vojud e
khareji nadareh"-now this phrase. "[V]ojud e khareji nadareh" idiomatically means
"does not exist" but literally means "has no external existence"-yet another polyvalent
phrasing that has embedded in it the suggestion that homosexuality is not a socially ac-
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antifeminist bugaboo that feminist jurisprudence is flawed for asserting
such a human being as "woman," or for claiming that women could have
a point of view or constitute a community or share a common experi-
ceptable behavior in Iran, namely we do not see it in public space-adding credence to
... a sympathetic reading of Ahmadinejad that in Iran these are private matters.
Id. at 34-35 (first alteration in original) (quoting an E-mail from Hamid Dabashi, Hagop Kevorkian
Professor of Iranian Studies & Comparative Literature, Columbia Univ., to Katherine Franke (Feb.
12, 2011, 12:29 PM EST) (on file with Katherine Franke) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Actu-
ally, the price of a public queer identification in Iran is state-sanctioned (often state-mediated) death,
a fact to which the string of citations Franke collects attests. See id. at 35-37; cf, e.g., Iranian Queer
Org., Human Rights Violations on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Homosexu-
ality in the Islamic Republic of Iran, INT'L GAY & LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION, 1-3, 6-7 (Oct.
5, 2011), http://iglhrc.org/sites/default/files/537-1. (identifying Iranian statutes that punish homosex-
ual acts by death); BE LIKE OTHERS (Tanaz Eshaghian 2008) (documenting experiences of men and
women seeking gender reassignment in Iran). But Franke seems to take Iran's position that docu-
mented executions of gays in Iran are perhaps not really obvious examples of the murder of gay men
at all, but actually only documented executions of pedophiles (again, a misinterpretation by Western
imperialists with a human rights agenda?). Franke, supra, at 36-37 ("it turns out, however, that the
young men in this picture were very likely prosecuted for sexually assaulting a thirteen-year old boy,
not for consensual homosexual conduct."). And, interestingly, here, unlike for Ahmadinejad, there is
no laborious examination of alternative interpretations. See id. I'm not sure on what grounds, or with
what evidence, Franke is convinced that those executed in the particular episode to which she refers,
youths who were, in fact, adolescents themselves, were pedophiles.
In any event, there is sympathy in Franke's piece with Joseph Massad's idea that there is
no such thing as a gay identity in the Muslim Middle East. Id. at 33-34; see Joseph Massad, Re-
Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World, 14 PUB. CULTURE 361, 363 (2002). 1
suppose it's all in whom you ask: Maybe it's reasonable to consider Ahmadinejad a reliable source.
What is most distressing for me about this particular aspect of Franke's article is that it moves to
erase the state's complicity in producing gay identity as always and only a private identity because
the penalty for public identification is death. Franke diminishes the price of public queerness exacted
from gays in Iran and all around the world. Feminists and gay liberationists have the pesky habit of
asking gay people for an account of their experiences and then believing what they tell us. So here
are some questions I'd like to put to queer theorists: If there is no such thing as gay people in the
Middle East or in Africa, as is widely claimed by multiculturalist theorists, then why was Hassan El
Menyawi tortured and exiled? Why is David Kato dead? Why did Abdellah Thia flee Morocco?
Why do roving death squads in Iraq target certain kinds of men for brutalization and death? Why do
countless men in Iran mutilate their bodies in order to conform their homosexuality to the mandated
gender dichotomy in an act of transsexualism sanctioned by the Iranian government-often under-
taken at state expense-and glorified by queer theory? This latter query alone should stand as an
unassailable indictment of the public price of queerness in Iran. What norm of modesty explains all
of this? And where, exactly, is the murder of gay people not an expression of religious or cultural
(often the same thing) values? See Shannon Gilreath, Why Gays Should Not Serve in the United
States Armed Forces: A Gay Liberationist Statement of Principle, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
7, 17-23, 27-30 (2011) (documenting assault, murder, and terrorization of gay people in the Middle
East and the United States by citing various reports).
I believe Franke and I are in agreement on the rudiments of the larger argument she makes
about resisting cooptation. I'm all for resisting essentialism, and cooptation and universalization, but
to take the real life experiences of gays in "foreign" places and to make of them merely a figment of
the Western mind seems a lot like cooptation to me. To say to gay women and men who have
claimed a gay identity, affirmatively and courageously, in the Middle East and Africa, and who have
suffered appallingly real experiences on account of it, that their identity is always a non-identity,
seems awfully essentializing to me. And a culturally relative defense of the murder of gays anywhere
is a defense (to borrow from Martin Luther King, Jr.) of the murder of gays everywhere. See
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289, 290 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986)
("Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."). That seems pretty universal.
I thank Hassan El Menyawi for pointing out Professor Franke's article to me and for his
always-clarifying conversation.
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ence.47 When Will Roscoe said of gays, quite profoundly, in my opinion,
that he could "think of no other contemporary minority whose intellectu-
als are so deeply invested in erasing their [identity], ' 48 he could have
added to these anti-identitarian censors the "anti-essentialism" critics of
feminism, who have engaged, whatever their motivation, in the same
kind of cover-up enterprise.
49
You know Ann, despite her dazzle as a classroom teacher and her
genuine love for and appreciation of her students and her groundbreaking
writing, never really identified as an academic. She saw herself as a fem-
inist activist. I think the academic obscurantism just summarized ex-
plains why. Ann agreed with Catharine MacKinnon that to be a good
theory, a theory has to be good in practice.50 In other words, for her, fem-
inist theory was not the playground of the especially enfranchised-a
group at whose apex lawyers must surely be placed. Ann was the child of
academics (her father was a university president); she was educated in
the privileged cocoons of Wellesley and Harvard; she got "the job" with
a fancy Wall Street law firm-the kind of job that tells law graduates
they've "made it."51 But Ann was not the sort of person to luxuriate in
the comfort of academic degrees or family privilege. She did what aca-
demics do not have to do: she faced reality. She cared about women-
and men-for whom sexual subordination is reality.
For Ann, feminist jurisprudence meant seeing sexual injury as a
form of discrimination. It also meant realizing that women's subordina-
tion to men is not natural or inevitable, but political, thus structural.
From the perspective of radical feminism, sexuality itself is structural.
This is the central tenet of feminism, and it is the central importance of
feminism to gay male liberation-the realization, as Andrea Dworkin put
it, that "[e]very social form of hierarchy and abuse is modeled on male-
over-female domination."52 To understand this is to see, in the light of
feminism, that the gay sexuality gay men experience is, in fact, produced
47. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT 158-59 (1988).
48. Will Roscoe, Aflerword to HARRY HAY, RADICALLY GAY: GAY LIBERATION IN THE
WORDS OF ITS FOUNDER 331, 347 (Will Roscoe ed., 1996). But see Steven Seidman, Identity and
Politics in a "Postmodern" Gay Culture: Some Historical and Conceptual Notes, in FEAR OF A
QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 105, 133-35 (Michael Warner ed., 1993)
(noting "a turn in poststructural gay theory beyond a critique of identity politics to a politics against
identity").
49. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 585-601 (1990) (criticizing Catharine MacKinnon's dominance theory as "flawed by its
essentialism").
50. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman
Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 13 (1991) ("It is common to say that something is good in
theory but not in practice. I always want to say, then it is not such a good theory, is it?").
51. See Audrey Fannin, 'Conversation with...' Speaker Advises Students to Not Do Work
They Hate, WAKE FOREST U. SCH. L. (Oct. 7, 2010), http://news.law.wfu.edu/2010/10/a-
'conversation-with-... '-ann-scales/.
52. ANDREA DWORKIN, OUR BLOOD: PROPHESIES AND DISCOURSES ON SEXUAL POLITICS 68
(1976).
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in the subject-object context of straight male supremacy. In other words,
the reality of sexuality for gay men, no less than women, is forged on the
anvil of straight male power. As MacKinnon put it, the "situation offers
no outside to stand on or gaze at, no inside to escape to ... no place else
to go. '53 If you doubt this is true, take a moment to really look at gay
male pornography. Here you see in technicolor the hermetic precision of
sexual hierarchy at work. In gay male pornography the structural domi-
nance of heteronormative sexuality-that sexuality in which sex is "gen-
dered to the ground' 54 and wielded as a weapon-is twisted open for all
but the willfully blind to see.55 The fact that so many gay men do not see
it is testament to the ontological and epistemological perfection of
straight male supremacy. This is precisely why consciousness-raising
became synonymous with feminist method as a form of political prac-
tice.
56
II. QUEER LEGAL THEORY AND GAY LIBERATION (QUEER THEORY AS
ANTITHESIS)
The best point of entry to engage queer theory jurisprudentially is
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.57 and the queer theoretical
debate that emerged from the case.58 Ann certainly thought Oncale was
profoundly important.59 The case established that same-sex sexual har-
assment was actionable;60 thus, men could no longer sexually dominate
other men in the workplace and be untouchable. As Marc Spindelman
put it, because Oncale disrupted the conventional social understandings
of men subordinating other men as simply "boys [being] boys" and of the
53. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 639 (1983).
54. Id. at 655.
55. GILREATH, supra note 24, at 169-70. See also infra Parts Ill, IV.
56. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 543 (1982) ("The pursuit of consciousness becomes a form of political prac-
tice."); Scales, supra note 39, at 1401 ("Feminist method proceeds through consciousness raising.");
Scales, supra note 2, at 29 ("The historical and personal experience of the oppressed, revealed
through consciousness-raising, is amply persuasive. In the meantime, lawyers must give up on
monolithic reality and believe that there is something to be learned and a better society to be
achieved by listening to formerly silenced people.").
57. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
58. In reality, Joseph Oncale's life was one of pornographic torture. While working on an oil
rig in the Gulf of Mexico, he was subjected to sexual torture by several male co-workers and super-
visors. Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523
U.S. 75 (1998). He was sexually assaulted on several occasions, during which he was held down
while a co-worker placed his penis on Oncale's body. Id. at 118. He was threatened with rape and
only narrowly escaped one rape attempt perpetrated in a communal shower. Id. at 118-19. Eventual-
ly, fearing for his safety, Oncale quit his job. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. His claims of sex discrimi-
nation through same-sex sexual harassment were held actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 76-79.
59. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
60. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
[Vol. 91:1
TOGETHER IN STRUGGLE
victims committing the normative infraction of failing to "take it like a
man," Oncale was a blow to male-supremacist thinking.
6'
Professor Janet Halley, however, assails the result as an invitation
for the Supreme Court to license homophobia in legal decision making,
particularly criticizing the brief filed by Professor Catharine MacKinnon
in support of Oncale's sex discrimination claim.62 Setting aside Halley's
various interpretive distortions of MacKinnon's brief and, by extension,
radical feminism,63 what I find most disturbing is Halley's reimagining
of Joseph Oncale's complaint. In truth, Oncale was the victim of at-
tempted gang rape and various other sexual assaults while employed on
an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico. His assailants were all men.
Proclaiming that she is going to "put [Oncale's] allegation of un-
wantedness aside, as a mere allegation"64 (as if that's somehow new,
instead of the standard male-supremacist response to any unwanted sex-
ual attention by men), Halley proceeds to turn Oncale's life into pornog-
raphy by making of his attempted rape the "fantasy" of gay male sexuali-
ty that male supremacy dictates as truth: Oncale wanted this rape as a
65gay man. He, as gay men do, wanted to be sexually dominated by (os-
tensibly) straight men. Halley writes:
We can imagine that a plaintiff with these facts willingly engaged in
erotic conduct of precisely the kinds described in Oncale's complaint,
or engaged in some of that conduct and fantasized the rest, or, in-
deed, fantasized all of it-and then was struck with a profound desire
to refuse the homosexual potential those experiences revealed in
him.6
6
Halley's pornographic fantasy of Oncale's real life is an extension
of the ethic of derealizing the real that flavors queer theory as, itself, an
extension of postmodernism. It also clearly demonstrates how "[q]ueer
theory... has in significant ways aligned itself with male supremacy and
its regulation of the general erotic economy that gives meaning to wom-
en's and men's sexual lives. 67 You see, queer theory as an epistemolog-
ical project-as an explanation of how we know who we are as gay men
and women-effectively turns "the Closet" inside out. The Closet ordi-
61. Marc Spindelman, Discriminating Pleasures, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LAW 201, 201 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
62. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra
note 61, at 182, 189-93.
63. Marc Spindelman lucidly illumines Halley's misperceptions in his piece in the book. See
Spindelman, supra note 61, at 204-16. Professor Spindelman subsequently revised and expanded his
argument while maintaining his disagreement with Halley. See Marc Spindelman, Sex Equality
Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 10-47 (2004).
64. Halley, supra note 62, at 192.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Spindelman, supra note 61, at 202.
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narily functions as a shroud. It is the place to which gay men and women
retreat in order to escape persecution and stigma. The price for this es-
cape is invisibility. Thus, in order to be "free" from stigma (and conse-
quently to have or retain any value whatsoever) in this basest conceptual-
ization of what that means, queers must accept their place in the hetero-
sexual hierarchy. Just as gays had forced the door of this existential
deathtrap open, queer theory came along and said that in order to live
meaningful, fulfilled lives-indeed, in order to be-queers should open
themselves to the erotic possibilities of the very sexual hierarchy that is
the engine of male supremacy, which means for gay men (as Halley re-
veals in her Oncale critique) that to be fucked by a straight man is the
apogee of sexual liberation.
Thus, in the insistence on the absence of limits as the meaning of
sexual liberation, Halley and queer theory suggest something much more
alarming than that lesbians and gay men cannot be legally liable for the
sexual injuries they cause, but rather that (at least in most cases) such
sexual injuries are not possible or, more precisely, are a function of the
victim's own internal homophobia-his refusal to live outside of the
Closet. If this is what Halley means when she says that queer theory
deemphasizes the differences between heterosexual and homosexual,
then we should all-gay and straight alike-be terrified.68 Whatever oth-
er conclusions may be drawn from it, it certainly illumines what she
means when she says that queer theory "thinks it is fine to be 'queer in
the streets, straight in the sheets.' 69 For the materialization of this reve-
lation in the daily reality of gay men's lives, gay male pornography
serves as the perfect propaganda.70 Now, how you can realize this and
fail to see that straight male supremacy is metaphysically nearly perfect
is beyond me. I'm still waiting for gay men to resent it.
Extending her critique, Halley insists that queer theory's objection
(and antagonism) to radical feminism stems from radical feminism's
perceived failure to understand that surrendering to such "pleasures"
"rearranges conventional associations of the feminine with subordination
and the masculine with power.,71 Halley provides as her example the fact
that lesbians and (according to her) increasing numbers of straight wom-
en fuck their partners with strap-on dildos.72 Here, Halley's argument
68. See Halley, supra note 62, at 194.
69. Id.
70. See GILREATH, supra note 24, at 169-203. Indeed, Halley could be simply describing gay
male porn when she explains that queer theory "tends to minimize ... the differences between same-
sex eroticism and cross-sex eroticism." Halley, supra note 62, at 196. Sadly, as I argue in The End of
Straight Supremacy, much of the mainstream gay rights movement serves this same function, as in,
for example, the push for assimilation into the marriage paradigm. See GILREATH, supra note 24, at
207-32; see also Nelson Tebbe et al., Debate, The Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 159 U. PA. L.
REv. PENNuMBRA 21, 28-35 (2010) (including Shannon Gilreath's rebuttal argument about gay
marriage at the debate).




reveals queer theory as little more than a manifestation of an aggressive,
reductive, and assimilationist transsexualism. At its most successful,
queer theory aspires to little more than gender role reversal. It might fair-
ly be called transintellectualism, for like the false claim of transsexual-
ism to any real gender disruption,73 queer theory merely tinkers with the
system of sexual hierarchy from which straight supremacy is ontological-
ly and epistemologically inseparable. As a normative project, queer theo-
ry remains committed to that same system. After all, if a central tenet of
male power is that the penis is a weapon,7 4 how does a lesbian using it in
the way it normally functions-to effectuate subordination through sex-
disrupt anything? And if gay men, in the porn they produce for them-
selves, merely follow the script set for them by male supremacy, how is
the sex held aloft as "fantasy" not simply heterosexuality in drag? But
queer theory cannot see this, refuses to see it, since its preferred concep-
tual framework makes power an individual plaything-something to be
"perform[ed]"75 -and thus renders structural critique impossible. By
contrast, feminist jurisprudence as a normative project works to under-
mine male supremacy. In this, it is queer theory's anathema, and it is for
gay women and men (and for all women and men), unlike queer theory, a
possible path to liberation.
To understand the connection between gay pornography, sexual vio-
lation, and queer theory in this way is to understand the truth in Ann's
definition of feminism with which I began: "Existing modes of power
attempt to essentialize our identities, the better to capture each and every
new incarnation as a market niche. My feminism is built from resistance
to that.,76 It is also to underline the life force of feminist jurisprudence,
the belief that in order for any of us to exercise any legal right-certainly
the right to free speech or the right to equality or the right to privacy-
we must first have an integrity of the body that is absolute. This is a
plausible reading of what Ann meant when she said, "Gender literacy is
among the most serious pro-life work that anyone can undertake.77 It is
also what led her to understand same-sex rape as a sex equality issue and
78abortion as a queer issue.
73. GILREATH, supra note 24, at 271.
74. ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 23-24 (1981) ("The
seventh tenet of male supremacy is that sexual power authentically originates in the penis. Masculin-
ity in action, narrowly in the act of sex as men define it or more widely in any act of taking, is sexual
power fulfilling itself, being true to its own nature.").
75. The notion of "performativity" is most closely associated with e work of Judith Butler.
See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 139-46
(1990).
76. SCALES, supra note 11, at 8.
77. Id.
78. See generally Scales, supra note 1, at 407-10.
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Ann saw Oncale as "the most positive queer case ever decided in
the U[nited ]S[tates] ... more important than Romer v. Evans... or
Lawrence v. Texas."79 More specifically,
Oncale opened the wider range of gender issues, including abuse by
sexualization in circumstances that no one can mistake for flirting. In
that case, the court came as close to understanding as it has yet that
sex discrimination is centrally about the production and manipulation
of gender norms: the issue was not that Joseph Oncale was harassed
because he was a man-he was harassed because of the kind of man
he was perceived to be. It had to be a sex discrimination case under
federal law, but it was also a victory for the principle, dear to the
hearts of feminists and queer theorists and all combinations thereof,
that no one should be forced "to occupy a gender norm that is under-
gone, experientially, as an unlivable violation."
80
Understanding this "force," however, remains problematic for queer the-
ory, because queer theory, not unlike liberalism, is obsessed with
"choice," and its legal equivalent, "agency." Indeed, in a rhetorical frame
in which nearly everything is up for grabs, in which hardly any facts can
be established and where every experience is merely contingent,
"choice" seems to be the only thing that is absolute; hence Halley's bot-
tom line that Joseph Oncale should simply have surrendered to the eroti-
cism offered him by his assailants in her (only just) imagined version of
what happened to him, and her proffer of the "lesbian phallus" as a revo-
lutionary culture shift.81
In queer theory's version of liberation, sexual liberation hinges on
seizing the dominant role by turns-on having the "option" to assume
the dominant position in sexual hierarchy, thus on sexualizing inequality.
Here we see queer theory most closely aligned with the trans-politics that
has emerged from it (and, I think, eclipsed it). Essentially, gay men no
less than gay women are told that we should become "male impersona-
tors," claiming the gender-specific power of which the masculinized
dominance of male supremacy robs us by gendering us feminine based
on our refusal to sexually dominate women-in other words, for siding
with the girls. This is supposedly revolutionary because, even though
some of us must necessarily assume the "submissive" role some of the
time, we have the option of trading it off for the dominant role. For gay
men especially, this means we have the option to be men again, in a sys-
tem in which to be a man is defined as being socially permitted to sexual-
ly dominate a feminized "other." ("Man fucks woman; subject verb ob-
ject.,82) This is the revolutionary potential queer theorists see in the "bot-
79. Id. at 403-04.
80. Id. at 404 (quoting JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 213 (2004)).
81. Halley, supra note 62, at 194 (citing Judith Butler's discussion of the "lesbian phallus" in
BODIES THAT MATYER: ON THE DIsCURsIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" 57-91 (1993)).
82. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 124 (1989).
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tom" having the option of becoming the "top," to use gay male cultural
lingo.
83
Missing entirely from this analysis is the fact that in this vision of
liberation gay men are liberated to do nothing not already scripted for us
by heterosexuality. Lesbians in strap-ons, too, are left in the same bind,
"liberated" to do little more than mimic sexually how male supremacy
says women are to be touched and fucked. What is jettisoned in all of
this pornographic "performing" is the ability to claim a space in which
some substantively equal alternative to this catatonia-inducing repetition
might be formulated.84 Queer theory, then, mistakes a sexuality embod-
ied by gender as an escape hatch from sexual inequality when, in fact,
this very sexuality is "the linchpin of gender inequality.85 It is also, it
should be said, a theory that does absolutely nothing for women, includ-
ing for lesbians qua women. As Andrea Dworkin explained, "devalued
males can often change status, escape; women and girls cannot."86 Cer-
tainly, the female usurpation of the dominant role socially, especially
sexually, is usually delimited by what women can work out with men on
male terms. In every conceivable incarnation, the sexuality aspired to by
queer theory reflects the hierarchical absolutes of male supremacy. It is
straight "in the streets" and "in the sheets."
III. PORNOGRAPHY
I want to probe further the ways in which queer theory reifies male
sexual power as the substance of culture, as well as expose this cultural
root in "gay male" pornography, through a reading of Janet Halley's
reading of Duncan Kennedy's Sexy Dressing.87 In her claiming of Ken-
nedy's avowedly heterosexual perspective as "queer,"88 Halley quite
clearly summarizes what Kennedy intended to say when he wrote Sexy
83. See, e.g., Carl F. Stychin, Exploring the Limits: Feminism and the Legal Regulation of
Gay Male Pornography, 16 VT. L. REV. 857, 886, 892 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The "top" is the insertive partner; the "bottom" is receptive.
84. Radical feminism, by contrast, has always supposed that such an alternative is possible,
indeed, that it already exists in certain counterfactual instances. So much for the old canard that
radical feminism theorizes all sex as "bad."
85. MacKinnon, supra note 56, at 533.
86. DwoRKIN, supra note 74, at 61.
87. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. (1993). By concentrating on Halley's work
as I have in this Essay, I hope I am not interpreted as making some normative evaluation of Halley's
work as the best representative of queer theory, although it certainly is representative. I focus on
Halley here only because her work fetishizing sexual injury in the name of queer theory handily
translates queer theoretical concepts to the realm of jurisprudence (by which I mean, as Ann did,
"legal theory generated by lawyers, as opposed to theories about law emerging from other disci-
plines." See SCALES, supra note 11, at 153 n. 1); because Halley, openly lesbian, claimed to articulate
queer theory in a male voice; and because Ann used Halley's work specifically as an example of the
limitations of poststructuralism. See, e.g., id. at 3, 139-40.
To avoid any possible misunderstanding, Ann Scales thought Janet Halley's prescription
to "'take a break from feminism['] ... is a bad idea." Id. at 3.
88. Janet Halley sub nom. Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL
THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS, supra note 1, at 9, 17-18.
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Dressing, which in fact espoused nothing particularly new. What is so
interesting about her gloss on Kennedy is how neatly it exposes the het-
eronormativity of what masquerades in theory circles as "queer." It is
precisely the unabashed heterosexual-ness of Kennedy's theory that
makes Halley, notably writing here sub nomine Ian Halley (I suppose
thus as a "queer man"), claim it as "queer" and, thus, antifeminist. Halley
writes:
Sexy Dressing takes women's sexy dress as a semiotic system that
registers, in subtle and dynamic ways, the degree to which women
are able to enter as strong, self-interested bargainers into sex and
sexually fun symbolic play with other women and with men. He ar-
gues from a position of highly identified "erotic interests"--his
own-which he bluntly characterizes as those of a heterosexual white
middle-class male who wants there to be women (on the street, in the
media, at work) who can afford to be erotically thrilling to
him.... The project is unequivocally pro-sex.
To me, moreover, it is distinctly "queer" in its analysis of sexuali-
ty, power, and knowledge. It fragments and "flips" the male/female
model-and because its reasons for doing so emerge not from Freud
but from social theory-the resulting pattern of sexual complexities
is explicitly political .... It's not feminist. It "Takes a Break from
Feminism." Moreover, seeing it as "queer" instead-because of its
embrace of male heterosexual erotic interests-provides deep satis-
faction to my own ambition that queer work would be able to "Take a
Break" not only from these feminist strictures, but also the homo-and
bi-supremacy that more or less go with the term so far.
89
First, Halley's synopsis of Kennedy's argument that he takes wom-
en dressed in sexually-objectifying ways as a/the way in which women
can "enter as strong, self-interested bargainers into sex ... with men," as
if it is somehow radical, strikes me as extraordinarily dim.9° If Kennedy
is articulating the point of view of heterosexual male-ness, then, of
course, this is his theme. This is little more than a restatement of the role
male supremacy has always allotted women. Women should be sexually
desirable and accessible everywhere for men. Women are told by the
same men who want to keep them this way that this is what makes wom-
en strong. (How convenient.) Historically, even when viewed as some-
how ruinous (think Eve), a woman's carnality has been propagandized as
her source of power. Even when the truth is closer to a woman's sexuali-
ty being defined as the reason she is to be subdued, harassed, raped, sub-
jected, married, and bred, the fiction is that men do everything in life to
win her sexual attentions. The male orgasm at the hands of a woman is
so powerful a motivator that he is powerless before her sinister, manipu-
89. Id.
90. Id. It is also consonant, I think, with the postmodern trend of taking a very simple concept
and smothering it with language in the hope that it will become unrecognizable and thus "novel."
[Vol. 91:1
TOGETHER IN STRUGGLE
lative charms. Via this fiction, "[t]he male, through each and every one
of his institutions [the public street, the media, any place of employ-
ment], forces the female to conform to his supremely ridiculous defini-
tion of her as sexual object."91 And if any lawyer or law professor needs
"proof," I should think the overwhelming content of any law library
would suffice.9 2 Halley's spin on this as being somehow sharp seems to
me to implicate exactly what I think Ann Scales meant when she criti-
cized "poststructuralism" for continually covering ground that has al-
ready been covered. 93 In any event, Halley names Kennedy's stance of
(hetero)male subjectivity and female-feminine objectivity unequivocally
as "pro-sex."94 This is no surprise for anyone familiar with Halley's take
on the sexual assault endured by Joseph Oncale. To be pro-sex in the
queer theoretical model is to be pro-objectification.
Next, and most interestingly, Halley moves to call Kennedy's
straight-male "algorithm" for maintaining straight male supremacy
"queer."95 In so doing, she lays queer theory's cards on the table. In her
reimagining of Oncale's ordeal, the acme of homosexual male sexual
experience is taken to be rape. In her reading of Kennedy, she broadens
this to include sexual objectification generally.96 As in the general thrust
of the transintellectual project, and following on her critique of Oncale,
Halley claims this "'flips the male/female model," thus undermining
structuralism of the feminist sort that Professor Kennedy claims is "para-
noid., 97 But, of course, nothing is flipped here. Assigning to women the
power of sex, when men in fact have it, has been an important way male
supremacy has perpetuated itself. (And in what universe is this not politi-
cal?) The fact hat some women no doubt do feel powerful in this frame
proves little more than its metaphysical perfection. As Andrea Dworkin
once put it: "When those who dominate you get you to take the initiative
in your own human destruction, you have lost more than any oppressed
people yet has ever gotten back."98 Finally, and in this light, Halley's
"ambition" that queer politics become more hetero-affirming aspires to
precious little.99 The thoroughly heterosexual, assimilationist value regis-
ter of most of mainstream gay and queer politics is already nearly total,
as I have documented at great length.'0°
91. DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 22.
92. A large and growing body of feminist work critiques the male supremacist bias of the
law's "objectivity" in nearly every facet of law. Ann contributed to this criticism. See, e.g., Scales,
supra note 9, at 718-23.
93. Scales, supra note 1, at 404.
94. Halley, supra note 88, at 17.
95. Id. at 17 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. See id.
97. KENNEDY, supra note 87, at 143, 145.
98. ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 143 (1987).
99. Halley, supra note 88, at 18.
100. See generally GILREATH, supra note 24, at 77-79, 223.
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Halley's recurring insistence that what is "queer". "flips" the
male/female structure is delusional. One needs to look no further than
gay male pornography for evidence.'°1 A popular genre of this pornogra-
phy is "gay for pay" porn, in which an ostensibly straight man is induced
into sex with a gay-identified man by one of two manipulations: either
the straight man is persuaded to have sex with the gay man by the medi-
ating influence of a woman, either for promise of sex with the woman
(whom he really wants), or because she tells him it turns her on sexually
to see him with another man. Or, he is induced into pornography through
an exploitation of sheer economic desperation, i.e., by the promise of
money, hence the "gay for pay" styling of much of this material.102 In the
first scenario, wherein a straight man is induced to have sex with a gay
man because he wants a woman, the intractability of the male/female
model, as Halley styles it, should be obvious enough.
The second scenario, in which money serves as a form of force,
may need more unpacking. In the system of male supremacy, money is
acutely sexual and is, indeed, indistinct from heterosexuality in opera-
tion, such that heterosexuality as we know it would cease to exist if the
money were extracted from it. As Andrea Dworkin observed,
Money is primary in the acquisition of sex and sex is primary in the
making of money: it is tied into every industry through advertis-
ing.., or items are eroticized in and of themselves because of what
they cost. In the realm of money, sex and women are the same com-
modity. Wealth of any kind, to any degree, is an expression of male
sexual power.103
"Gay for pay" pornography is in keeping with this general script of male
supremacy because what makes sex with straight men sexy is that in each
of these cases gay men work out the "objectification" of the straight men
in explicitly straight male terms. In other words, this pornography reveals
that masculinity follows from the use of money as force, primary in the
acquisition of sex, and internalized in gay men as a function of the mas-
culine process taken as the route to value. "A commitment to money as
such follows as an obvious and public commitment to the display of
In 1986, Ann described the hegemonic method of patriarchy as: "[I]ts aims are united
within a social fabric by assimilating the subordinated classes into the dominant one, and by allying
those classes with it." Scales, supra note 39, at 1379. If there is a more lucid description of what is
going on in the liberal support of same-sex marriage, I wish someone would clue me in to it.
101. Halley argues that queer theory emerged, at least in part, as an opposition force to the
MacKinnon/Dworkin anti-pornography civil rights ordinance. Compare infra note 110 and accom-
panying text, with Halley, supra note 88, at 26 ("[Wle probably wouldn't have queer theory if there
had not been the need for articulate pro-sex opposition ... to male/female model regulatory ambi-
tions (for example, anti-pomography ordinances).").
102. See generally GILREATH, supra note 24, at 174-75 (explaining the two manipulations:
promises of money or sex with women).
103. DWORKiN, supra note 74, at 20-21.
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masculinity as an aggressive and an aggrandizing drive."' 4 Thus, in both
form and function, this "gay" pornography is compulsorily heterosexual,
and so is the queer theory that endorses the primacy of its message. No
"break" from "homo-supremacy" need be taken.10 5 Straight men remain
in control ontologically, because their existence as straight men drives
the fantasy and shapes its parameters.10 6 They are still firmly on top hier-
archically because this gay experience is little more than their desires,
and the process for achieving them, functionally translated, however
briefly, into "queer" form.107 Gay men have negotiated this "liberation"
only on the terms allowed them by the oppressor. A theory aggrandizing
this as subversive is a case of The Emperor Having New Clothes.10 8 As I
have noted elsewhere, "[i]n gay pornography we see what heterosexuali-
ty is"; 19 in Halley's explication of queer theory, we see it too.
IV. FEMINISM AND GAY LIBERATION: TOGETHER IN STRUGGLE
Ann Scales was a fervent supporter of the anti-pornography civil
rights ordinance proposed by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin. The ordinance, to date the only serious legal proposal to deal
with pornography's harms, defined pornography as "the graphic[,] sex-
ually explicit subordination" of women, men, children, or transsexuals.'I0
Of the effort, Ann wrote:
It is possible that pornography regulation would cut into the vicious
cycle of gender hierarchy. The social construction of gender could
change, and that would be to everyone's benefit. Both women and
men are significantly eaten up by genderization. The gender hierar-
chy deprives men of their humanity; it deprives women of their
lives.
1 1
Radical feminists, like Ann, who have opposed pornography because of
the recognition that it is the nerve center112 of male supremacy, have at-
104. Id. at 22.
105. Halley, supra note 88, at 18.
106. See GILREATH, supra note 24, at 173-76 (discussing the masculine archetype).
107. Id.
108. See HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES (Naomi Lewis trans.,
Candlewick Press 1997). Or, if the reader prefers an analogy better made to high literature, perhaps
"a tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing" fits. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
109. GILREATH, supra note 24, at 169-70.
110. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 20, at 262, for a discussion of the
ordinance. Although MacKinnon and Dworkin proposed their ordinance in slightly different versions
at different times, the structure reflected here was unaltered. See id.
Ill. Scales, supra note 2, at 32 (footnote omitted). I think Ann would permit me a correction
here. Pornography does deprive gay men of our lives in myriad ways. See GILREATH, supra note 24,
at 190-201 (detailing the correlation between an upsurge in "bareback" pornography and spiking
HIV infection rates, the risk to performers in gay pornography in terms of sexually transmitted
infections as well as substance addiction, and the connection between pornography and pervasive
rates of sexual abuse within male-male homosexual relationships).
112. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 24-25. ("The harmony and coherence of hateful
values, perceived by men as normal and neutral values when applied to women, distinguish pornog-
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tacked its role in the subordination of women and men. Gay men, mostly
blind to pornography's harms, have not been as quick to see the relation-
ship of "women's issues" to their lives or their politics. But as I noted
before, in her analysis of queer theory, Ann gave us this gem:
"[A]bortion is the queerest issue there is.""l1 3 Abortion is a sex equality
issue, to be sure, but Ann illumines it as a gay liberation issue as well.
She wrote:
One is ineluctably reminded of the ongoing kerfuffle about what
"causes" homosexuality .... It is convenient to the powers-that-be to
portray homosexuality as an unconstrained "choice" that could simp-
ly be . . . remedied by the advances of science. Abortion is another
context where "choice" is portrayed by opponents as a matter of de-
structive petulance on the part of women with unwanted pregnancies.
In real life, reasons for abortion vary hugely, and simply must not be
constrained by some legislature's schedule of acceptable considera-
tions. 114
Abortion, like pornography, constructs women and men as such.
Restrictions on abortion for women (necessarily, since only women need
abortions), who have virtually always less say over the when, how, and
why of pregnancy in the first instance, is a function of sexual hierarchy.
Gender is not irrelevant to the abortion question, and gender's meaning
produces men and women in its image. 15 Anti-abortion restrictions oper-
ate as sexual politics forming an integral part of the male-supremacist
process that makes gender hierarchy-inequality-into social reality. For
many, if not most, women seeking an abortion, as Ann pointed out,
choice is not how they got there. I am reminded of a line from a Maya
Angelou poem that reads: "She stands / before the abortion clinic, / con-
founded by the lack of choices."' 16 The focus on choice or agency, or
whatever other convenient legal synonym can be thought of, merely
serves to invisibilize the overwhelming force that is ineluctably a part of
the environment that produces the need for abortions and the restrictions
that limit access to them. This conceit, this fiction of autonomy masking
a reality of force, is what keeps male supremacy running like a well-oiled
machine. As Adrienne Rich asked, "[W]hose interest is served, and
whose fantasies expressed, by representing abortion as the selfish, will-
raphy as message, thing, and experience. The strains of male power are embodied in pornography's
form and content, in economic control of and distribution of wealth within the industry, in the pic-
ture or story as thing, in the photographer or writer as aggressor, in the critic or intellectual who
through naming assigns value, in the actual use of models, in the application of the material in what
is called real life ....").
113. Scales, supra note 1, at 407.
114. Id.
115. This is crucial to understand: Gender hierarchy is never not relevant. Males learn, prac-
tice, and affirm heterosexual values because mastery of these values is the only way to win the
acceptance of fathers and male peers.
116. MAYA ANGELOU, Our Grandmothers, in I SHALL NOT BE MOVED 33, 36 (1990).
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ful, morally contagious expressin of woman 's predilection for vio-
lence?"'1 7 Following Rich, Ann provided much needed clarification:
The abortion decision is too much like history-making: it is morally
complex, it is often morally compromised, it is a matter of taking re-
sponsibility for difficult and sometimes unanticipated results. It is
important for the right-wing to describe the abortion decision as ca-
pricious. In the context of the oppression of women, arguments
against abortion often involve perverse attempts to portray the violat-
ed as the violent. .. . But "violent" is precisely what women cannot
be, according to the law, and the legal power to do "violence," how-
ever narrowly defined, is a credential for the autonomy that the law
presumes men and women to possess equally. 118
Ann illuminated how the seemingly contradictory faces of the "pro-life"
movement in fact pose no contradiction at all. While it is true that many
members of the "pro-life" movement condemn abortion but "support the
death penalty and the moral righteousness of war," there is no actual
tension in these positions because "those are decisions traditionally made
by men in legislatures and situation rooms; a woman qua woman just
doesn't have the capacity to decide any matters of life and death."'19
I began this Essay with an explanation of just how far queer theory
is willing to go. Taken at face value, it stands for the principle that sexual
injuries to gay people are a virtual impossibility. How one can express a
devotion to gay/queer people and yet embrace that position is hard to
understand. And yet I think Ann, through her careful attention to the
abortion question and her linkage of the abortion issue to gay liberation,
has given us the building blocks for the best explanation of queer theo-
ry's embrace of gender and death. 1
20
Gay people have been denied by compulsory heterosexuality the
capacity to decide matters of life and death. Queer theory purports to
claim that capacity, in the process eschewing anything that smacks of
victimization, including, generally, any admission that gay men raped by
straight men didn't want what they got. It is a theoretical posture purport-
ing to give gays what male supremacy and its Closet have stolen from us:
117. RICH, supra note 12, at 17.
118. Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymo-
ron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 37 (1989).
119. Id.
120. Ann wrote that, "[u]ltimately, force and gender are parts of the same death-seeking pro-
cess." Id at 26. When you couple this with Simone Weil's observation of the kind of "force that
does not kill, i.e., that does not kill just yet... [but rather has] the ability to turn a human being into
a thing while he is still alive," you see why those threatened with this force feel they have little
alternative but to "imitate nothingness in their own persons." SIMONE WELL, THE ILIAD, OR THE
POEM OF FORCE 4, 7 (Mary McCarthy & Dwight Macdonald trans., Pendle Hill 1983). We also see
exactly what queer theory (and liberal theory) risks by invisibilizing force through a rhetoric of
"choice" or "performativity." See generally Marc Spindelman, supra note 32, at 179-222, for an
especially lucid look at how gender and death are equally generative principles for queer theory.
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the capacity to choose sexual autonomy. What the queer theorists seem
to miss is that they have provided no choice that the dichotomization of
the Closet did not already offer: the choice between existential destruc-
tion and physical destruction. 12 To miss this is to miss much.
What "academented122 theory obscures, pornography makes plain.
Gay porn mogul Chuck Holmes said that his legendary porn production
company, Falcon Studios, presented characters "who looked like they
wouldn't ever do anything but be the best little fellows-the little busi-
nessmen, the good members of their community-and all of a sudden
they'd just kiss each other, and all hell would break loose, and they'd just
try to fuck one another to death."123 If in pornography straight men are
actualized by the fuck, both in the films and in the application of porno-
graphic values in the real world (which civil libertarian defenders of por-
nography encourage us to think of as two separate spheres), gay men are
actualized too, each according to his purpose. What Chuck Holmes elu-
cidates is the stark difference in what this actualization means-the dif-
ference in what the fuck means-for gay men submerged in pornography
and pornographic culture, fucking is annihilation. And it is more than
just self-annihilation; it is mutual annihilation, not merely suicidal, but
homicidal.124 So much for contingency; so much for choice.
121. MacKinnon, supra note 53, at 654-55 ("Whose subjectivity becomes the objectivity of
'what happened' is a matter of social meaning, that is, it has been a matter of sexual politics. One-
sidedly erasing . . . violation or dissolving the presumptions into the subjectivity of either side are
alternatives dictated by the terms of the object/subject split, respectively. These are alternatives that
will only retrace that split until its terms are confronted as gendered to the ground.").
122. See MARY DALY & JANE CAPUTI, WEBSTERS' FIRST NEW INTERGALACTIC WICKEDARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 184 (1987) (defining "academentia" as "n : normal state of persons in
academia, marked by varying and progressive degrees; irreversible deterioration of faculties of
intellectuals" (attributing Diana Beguine with the invention of "academentia")).
123. JEFFREY ESCOFFIER, BIGGER THAN LIFE: THE HISTORY OF GAY PORN CINEMA FROM
BEEFCAKE TO HARDCORE 134-35 (2009) (quoting Falcon: The Bird's-Eye View, How Founder
Chuck Holmes Built a Sex-Video Giant, UNZIPPED, Apr. 13, 1999, at 16, 21 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Ann Scales understood that death and mass murder were supreme pornographic values
enacted by male supremacy on a worldwide scale. "Mount Rushmore is ecologically pornographic..
. . Mount Rushmore portrays nature as being enhanced by being mutilated in the image of what
white males think nature ought to be and do." Scales, supra note 10, at 95. And then, with regard to
the images carved into Mount Rushmore, she added, "Mount Rushmore might as well be sublimely
ridiculous. As long as we are defacing, let's add Edward Teller, Ivan Boesky, and Richard Speck."
Id. at 95 n.2.
124. In most heterosexual pornography, the assumption is that the used female bodies will
survive. Thus, as Dworkin notes, "[r]uthless blame-'you provoked me'-is used to encourage the
individual and social silence which is the most hospitable environment for the continuation of con-
quest." DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 24. In gay male pornography, by contrast, there is apparently no
presumption of survival. As Marc Spindelman explains of gay sexuality, expanding on Catharine
MacKinnon's rendering of male supremacy into grammar ("Man fucks woman; subject verb ob-
ject."): "Man fucks man, man kills man." See Marc Spindelman, Sexuality's Law, 24 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 198) (on file with Ohio State University, Moritz
College of Law).
One wonders, given Janet Halley's pornographic reframing of Joseph Oncale's experienc-
es, what she would have said to Konerak Sinthasomphone, a fourteen-year-old victim of Jeffrey
Dahmer, who briefly escaped but was returned to Dahmer by Milwaukee police, despite his head
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Gay men have our situation, generally on the bottom of male-
supremacist hierarchy, propagandized as a choice, in the way that Ann
notes-that our sexuality is a function of choice-but in other important
ways too. When, as boys, we are tormented and abused by other males,
we are told that "boys will be boys" and that if we are going to be so
openly gay we should simply expect abusive treatment.125 When we are
sexually assaulted and sexually harassed out of our jobs as adults, we are
told by bourgeois law professors that we wanted it and that we should
choose to enjoy it. And the pornography in which and through which we
are objectified is defended as a choice, too. In fact, we are told it is our
choice, and when we refuse to accept that, we are told that it is somebody
else's choice to objectify us, which also happens to be these same some-
bodies' free speech or art or fantasy. We are told that their choice to ob-
jectify us is more important than our desire not to be an object-not to be
their speech or art or fantasy. When we are told that pornography and our
objectification in and through it is an idea, or an expression, or a fantasy,
we are not told that it is a process. We are encouraged not o see that
pornography is a process of objectification. The objectification I am talk-
ing about cannot be admitted by most liberals or by queer theory or by
other poststructuralist strains that claim to be "pro-sex" because some-
thing real is going on here in which choice-at least for those being ob-
jectified-is merely an illusion. In order to be objectified, one must first
be a subject-a status in which choice is said to reside. But through the
process of objectification the subject becomes an object, a thing defined
always only by the potential use to which it can be put. Choice is alien to
this frame. A chair does not choose to be sat upon. A car does not choose
to be driven. They are objects existing merely as an extension of their
use. They are made for this use. To be objectified for the purpose of sex,
which is to be made for sex, which is to be made into a "sex object," is to
be in exactly the same place as the chair or the car. 1
26
Thus it is not enough to say simply that pornography depicts gay
men-those in pornography and by extension the majority of gay men
who are overwhelmingly the consumers of pornography'27 -as wanting
bleeding from the obvious wounds where Dahmer had attempted to drill holes in his skull with a
power drill, because the officers believed they were witnessing typical gay sex gone slightly awry.
Milwaukee Panel Finds Discrimination by Police, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at 138; GILREATH,
supra note 24, at 200. Let's imagine (as queer theorists like to do) that Sinthasomphone, a Laotian
immigrant who spoke nearly no English, made it to Harvard and encountered queer legal theory in
all its macabre grandeur. Should he have taken Halley's advice to embrace this torture-experienced
as sexually arousing by Dahmer, thus as sex-to the point of death? This is not a rhetorical question.
125. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
126. Accord MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 20, at 173 ("A sex object is
defined on the basis of its looks, in terms of its usability for sexual pleasure, such that both the
looking-the quality of the gaze, including its point of view-and the definition according to use
become eroticized as part of the sex itself.").
127. See GILREATH, supra note 24, at 170 n.3. Of the "multibillion dollar per year business"
that is pornography, "revenues from sales of gay male pornography constitute approximately half of
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to be humiliated, subjected, battered, possessed, ultimately sexualized-
to be sex-because here, again, the conceit of choice is preserved. But an
object exists only as a function of its use. Pornography is a process of
objectification that, by definition, obliterates the choices of those por-
nographed to make it and those who internalize its meaning through con-
sumption of its message. We are made things. Things do not choose.
Things are acted upon according to their purpose. To see choice here is
an option available only to a very few-usually, it seems to me, an arti-
fice contrived by the patriarchalists and those most useful to them for
perpetuating the system, mostly academics and the criminally insane.
One thinks here of the various theories of how the Jews, systematically
slaughtered by the Nazis, went willingly to the ovens.
129
Once objectification has been accomplished, the dominant succeed
ontologically on their own terms: the force necessary to sustain the sys-
tem is invisibilized. Pornography is a process by which heterosexuality
remains compulsory, no less for gay men than for anyone else, since in
gay pornography the images we see of gay sex are merely reflections of
the heterosexual norm. The only fantasy involved is the fantasy that we
choose any of it. You see, for all the queer theoretical posturing about
role choice, "topping" and "bottoming," fucker or fuck-ee, a sexuality
locked in genderized hierarchy through eroticized dominance and sub-
mission permits no real choice. In pornography-on film and in every-
day life-we do not choose a role; we are assigned a role. And as
MacKinnon noted, "Gender is an assignment made visually."
130
Building on Simone Weil's observation that force "is that x that
turns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing,"'131 Ann Scales ob-
served that "[t]he patriarchal combination of force and gender accounts
for our frustrating experience of patriarchy as a house of mirrors as well
as an imposing monolith.... It requires that men thingify women in or-
der to be worthy to be thingified themselves."132 And anyhow, if being a
"sex object," or if being pimped on film or otherwise is such a great
"choice," one has to wonder why more straight men aren't doing it. Or,
for that matter, why more tenured law professors aren't "choosing" it. As
[the profit]." Id. Since estimates putting us at around ten percent of the total population are consid-
ered generous, this fact is really quite astonishing. Id.
128. See id. at 130 ("The oppressed person begins to wonder if he, indeed, may be that thing
that his oppressors say he is. Dehumanization is a very effective means of changing someone into
nothing because it ensures that the messages one hears from others about oneself eventually become
the messages one hears from oneself about oneself, and that is all the more damaging.").
129. See Samuel P. Oliner, Jewish Heroes and the Wilhelm Bachner Story, HIDDEN CHILD
(Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, New York), 2012, at 7, 19-20 (discussing the myth of
Jewish passivity during the Holocaust and noting that "[t]he distortion by anti-Semites, and even by
some Jews, that Jews didn't care about hemselves or their family and that they walked passively to
their death, is far from the truth. It is a falsehood that needs to be corrected.").
130. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 20, at 173.
131. WElL, supra note 120, at 3 (emphasis added).
132. Scales, supra note 118, at 26.
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Ann Scales explained: "Being on the bottom of a hierarchy is not a pose,
it is not a choice, there is nothing safe about it, and it only looks brave
and defiant to those for whom its choicelessness and violation and dead-
ended chances look romantic and elevated because they are not real."'
133
Queer theory, with its celebration of sexual violence and death and
its pointed rejection of law as a means to change, is anchored in this kind
of unreality because it is detached from gay people's experiences. This is
not to say, of course, that those people postulating queer theory are not
entitled to a claim to experiences that matter or are real, but only to say
that queer theory proceeds from a posture that is swallowed by its partic-
ularities. Until very recently, gay people have not had much of a claim to
choice or to the law. Instead, choice and agency and, indeed, law itself,
have been only alien concepts. If it weren't for the fact that queer theory
comes primarily from those who have had a choice, or at least are now at
the apex of choice, being mostly in the academy, the surrender posited by
queer theory might be an understandable response to a lethally anti-gay
culture. Instead it is a willful abandonment of law and the state by people
who should know better. When law is thus abandoned, left to the devices
and prerogatives of the already powerful, that power is consolidated and
strengthened. How can it escape notice that in this environment the phys-
ical force to which Joseph Oncale was subjected, and to which countless
women and gay men are subjected daily, is the law and, thus, is reali-
ty?' 34 Queer theory is, in this respect, either remarkably cruel or its pro-
genitors are really quite far removed from the realities most women and
gay people face. Force and sexual abuse seem a lot less like a lovely aca-
demic game of charades when you are the one with the fist in your
face. 35 As an opposite of queer theory, "A feminist theory and practice
attempts to account for the fracturing of reality, and then to make reality
whole again."'
' 36
Ann once told me that what drew her to the law was the law's abil-
ity "to make itself stick." I have always found that explanation incredibly
appealing. It is this power of the law to change circumstances and power
realities that make it a necessary tool for gay liberation, not something to
run away from or satirize. Several years ago, Jamie Nabozny, the gay
plaintiff in Nabozny v. Podlesny,37 the case establishing that same-sex
sexual harassment of one student by another in school, when the school
administration discriminates in its response on the basis of sexual orien-
133. Scales, supra note 39, at 1392.
134. Compare GILREATH, supra note 24, at 137-39 (discussing violence against gays general-
ly), with id. at 199 (discussing the high degree of physical and sexual violence within same-sex
relationships).
135. ANDREA DWORKIN, LIFE & DEATH: UNAPOLOGETIC WRITINGS ON THE CONTINUING WAR
AGAINST WOMEN 118 (1997) ("There's nothing abstract about it. This is a war in which his fist is in
your face.").
136. Scales, supra note 118, at 52.
137. 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
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tation, could be the basis for a sustainable constitutional suit,138 told me
how much his victory in that case meant to him. What the law did for
Nabozny was to give him back the hope his abusers had taken from him.
It allowed him to go from a sullen, suicidal, defeated youth to the re-
markably well-spoken, confident, witty grown man I met. It also gave
him the drive to devote his life to other victimized gay youths. It gave
him back his humanity. And what Nabozny's case did for gay children
was to give them a tool to reclaim this same hope, without which there is
no humanity. Any theory that purports to have as its focus the lives and
hopes of the sexually marginalized can do nothing if it cannot do that.
Right now I can hear Ann saying, "I'm [o]nly [g]onna [t]ell [y]ou [t]his
[o]ne [m]ore [t]ime" 139: A theory not good in practice is not a good theo-
140ry.
CONCLUSION
In April 2005, only a little before Ann delivered her critique of
queer theory at Emory Law School, Andrea Dworkin died. In the last
couple of paragraphs of that paper, Ann remembered her friend. It is hard
not to see the parallels between these two women, both of whom were
brilliant, tough, warm, empathic, and humble. Ann wrote:
Andrea Dworkin died the same week as Pope John Paul II. Millions
of people mourned publicly for the Pope. I wished that there were a
women's St. Peter's Square where those of us who loved and re-
spected and owed so much to Andrea could gather to grieve. This
will have to do.
141
I am grateful that Ann is getting this Symposium, which she deserves.
It's something that Andrea, to date, hasn't gotten, at least not in the Unit-
ed States.
Ann continued, with Andrea's memory as context:
There is nothing to be gained by portraying any particular experi-
ence of oppression as inevitable or primary. At the same time, there
is much to be lost from refusal to recognize the regularity of some
kinds of injuries. There is no reductionism or essentialism, nor any-
thing intellectually passd about recognizing the suffering that women
undergo as women, simply because they are women. Ditto for the in-
juries suffered by transgendered people because of that status, and by
gay people because of that status, and by anyone else who isn't
measuring up to the dictates of sacred and narrow institutions. We
should always engage in debates about the difficulty of grounding
138. Id. at 457-58.
139. Scales, Disappearing Medusa, supra note 20, at 36 n. 10.
140. See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 13 ("It is common to say that something is good in
theory but not in practice. I always want to say, then it is not such a good theory, is it?").
141. Scales, supra note 1, at 409.
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normative claims, and the dangers of normativity being transformed
into normalization. Those disputes will never be over. In the mean-
time, however, we should put more energy into opposing demonstra-
ble instances of injustice.
42
I can't really think of a better way to close this Essay, except to re-
member a facet of Ann's life that she definitely would have wanted re-
membered: Ann never let anyone forget that she was a Westerner-an
Okie-a real cowgirl. As a young woman, in fact, she was a successful
rodeo rider, earning her among her close friends the honorific title "Ro-
deo Gal." These experiences gave her an authentic pioneer spirit-a real
freedom of mind and spirit that made all of us who came close to her a
little freer. Certainly, experiencing her freed me to say all of this. Per-
haps now Ann is freer still, for as Ann's dear friend and mine, Jane Ca-
puti, recently reminded me, energy does not "pass away," as we like to
say, but is simply transformed.43 So, in the words of Ann's beloved Kit-
ty MacKinnon, "precious rodeo gal, ride on."'144 As for me, I'll keep on
doing my best to live what Ann taught me, which is to say: I'll see you
on the barricades, which is exactly where Ann wanted us to be. 
45
142. Id. at 409-10.
143. See Jane Caputi, Professor, Fla. Atl. Univ., Remarks at the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law Symposium Honoring the Work of Ann Scales: Ann Scales on the Patriar-
chal/Pornographic Paradigm, with Meditations on the Ongoing Medusean Makeover (Mar. 30,
2013).
144. E-mail from Catharine MacKinnon to Ann Scales (Jan. 12, 2009, 6:58 AM) (used with
permission).
145. These are the words with which Ann closed her remembrance of Andrea Dworkin. Scales,
supra note 1, at 410 ("See you on the barricades, where Andrea would want us all to be.").
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